Abstract Some market participants and policy-makers believe that index fund investment was a major driver of the 2007-2008 spike in commodity futures prices. One group of empirical studies does find evidence that commodity index investment had an impact on the level of futures prices. However, the data and methods used in these studies are subject to criticisms that limit the confidence one can place in their results. Moreover, another group of studies provides no systematic evidence of a relationship between positions of index funds and the level of commodity futures prices. The lack of a direct empirical link between index fund trading and commodity futures prices casts considerable doubt on the belief that index funds fueled a price bubble.
Introduction
The financial industry has developed new products that allow institutions and individuals to invest in commodities through long-only index funds, over-the-counter (OTC) swap agreements, exchange traded funds, and other structured products. Regardless of form, these instruments have a common goal -to provide investors with buy-side exposure to returns from a particular index of commodity prices. 1 Several influential academic studies concluded that investors can capture substantial risk premiums and reduce portfolio risk through relatively modest investments in long-only commodity index funds (e.g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006; Erb and Harvey 2006) . Combined with the availability of deep and liquid exchange-traded futures contracts, these conclusions set off a dramatic surge in commodity index fund investments. While there is uncertainty about the best way to measure the magnitude of this surge, it is safe to say that at least $100 billion of new investment moved into commodity futures markets between . Domanski and Heath (2007 term this the "financialization" of commodity futures markets. Given the size and scope of the index fund boom, it should probably not come as a surprise that a worldwide debate has ensued over the role of index funds in commodity markets. This debate has important ramifications from a policy and regulatory perspective, as well as practical implications for the efficient pricing of commodity products.
On one side, a number of hedge fund managers, commodity end-users, policy-makers, and some economists contend that commodity index investment was a major driver of the [2007] [2008] "I firmly believe that the current record oil price in excess of $135 per barrel is inflated. I believe, based on supply and demand fundamentals, crude oil prices should not be above $60 per barrel . . . There were no unexpected changes in industry fundamentals in the last 12 months, when crude oil prices were below $65 per barrel. I cannot think of any reason that explains the run-up in crude oil price, beside excessive speculation," (Gheit 2008, p.2). This line of reasoning fueled political pressure to limit speculative positions in commodity futures markets, particularly in energy futures markets. The recently-passed 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act provided regulators with the authority needed to implement such limits. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) now has broad authority to set aggregate speculative position limits on futures and swap positions in all non-exempt "physical commodity markets" in the United States.
On the other side, a number of market analysts and economists have expressed skepticism about the bubble argument, citing logical inconsistencies and contrary facts (e.g., Krugman 2008; Pirrong 2008; Sanders and Irwin 2008; Smith 2009 ). This group has argued that commodity markets in [2007] [2008] were driven by fundamental supply and demand factors that pushed prices higher not "excessive speculation." Factors cited as driving the price of crude oil include strong demand from China, India, and other developing nations, a leveling out of crude oil production, a decrease in the responsiveness of consumers to price increases, and U.S. monetary policy (e.g., Hamilton 2009a; Kilian and Murphy 2010) . In the grain markets, the diversion of row crops to bio-fuel production and weather-related production shortfalls are cited, as well as demand growth from developing nations, U.S. monetary policy, and a lack of investment in basic production infrastructure (e.g., Trostle 2008; Wright 2009) .
Even though over two years have passed since the 2008 peak in commodity prices, the controversy surrounding index funds continues unabated. For instance, Michael Masters, Portfolio Manager for Masters Capital Management, LLC, made the following statement at a March 2010 CFTC hearing:
"Passive speculators are an invasive species that will continue to damage the markets until they are eradicated. The CFTC must address the issue of passive speculation; it will not go away on its own. When passive speculators are eliminated from the markets, then most consumable commodities derivatives markets will no longer be excessively speculative, and their intended functions will be restored," (Masters 2010, p.5) .
Joachim von Braun, director of Germany's Center for Development Research, made these comments at a March 2010 conference linking high food prices and world hunger:
"We have good analysis that speculation played a role in 2007 and 2008 . . . Speculation did matter and it did amplify, that debate can be put to rest. These spikes are not a nuisance, they kill. They've killed thousands of people," 3 .
These statements illustrate the acrimonious and heated nature of the public policy debate surrounding the role of index funds in commodity futures markets. The purpose of this article is to provide a thorough review and synthesis of the arguments on both sides of the debate about the impact of index funds in commodity futures markets, as well as a careful assessment of the latest empirical research on the subject. We consider empirical studies that test for general bubble-like price activity over the [2007] [2008] period, as well as those that specifically link market behavior to index fund positions. This "taking stock" is important given the stakes involved in the outcome of the debate. If index fund investment was responsible for a large bubble in commodity futures prices, difficult questions are raised about the basic price discovery and risk-shifting functions of these markets. New regulatory limits on speculation would likely be justified even if costly to some market participants. If supply and demand fundamentals rather than index investment were responsible for the commodity price spike, then new limits on speculation would not be justified and could do substantial harm to the efficient functioning of these markets. Before delving into the arguments and evidence, we provide an overview of commodity index funds in the next section.
Commodity Index Funds
Commodity index investments share the common goal of tracking the broad movement of commodity prices. The Standard and Poor's-Goldman Sachs Commodity Index TM (S&P-GSCI), is one of the most widely tracked indices and is generally considered an industry benchmark; it is computed as a (quantity) production-weighted average of the prices from 24 commodity futures markets. While the index is well-diversified in terms of number of markets and sectors, the production-weighting results in a relatively large 67% weight towards the energy sector, and a fairly small 21% in traditional livestock and agricultural markets. 4 The other industry benchmark is the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index TM (DJ-UBS). The DJ-UBS market weights are based on a combination of economic significance and market liquidity, with a maximum weight of 33% in any sector. Energy markets receive a weight of 28%, and the livestock and agricultural sectors combine to 40% of the DJ-UBS index. 5 In both of these popular indices, the market weights, contract switching or rollover conventions, and contract months traded are well-publicized, resulting in a transparent and well-defined index.
Investors can gain exposure to commodity indices through a number of investment vehicles, but the positions often find their way to the commodity futures markets. 6 A minority of institutions and individuals may gain commodity exposure by directly purchasing futures contracts in a manner that mimics a popular index. However, this number is relatively small, as most institutions are barred from directly trading futures (Stoll and Whaley 2010) , and most individuals would have difficulty replicating a broad-based index.
As an alternative to directly purchasing futures, institutions often invest in a fund that promises to mimic a popular commodity index. The fund manager will then either directly invest in futures or gain the promised market exposure by entering an over-the-counter (OTC) swap contract with a swap dealer. Swaps and other OTC derivatives are popular because they can be tailored by a swap dealer to meet the specific needs of a client. An index swap is a derivative contract structured to provide a payoff that is indexed to one of the popular commodity indices (see Chapter 5, Hull (2000) , for examples of swap contracts). The swap dealer will in turn enter the futures market and take long positions in the corresponding futures contracts to offset the risk associated with their side of the OTC derivative. As an alternative, institutional investors may choose to bypass the fund and enter directly into a commodity return swap with a swap dealer. Again, the swap dealer will be the agent who actually takes the long positions in the futures markets.
For individual investors, investment firms offer funds whose returns are tied to a commodity index. Both exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and structured notes (ETNs) have been developed that track commodity indices. ETFs are essentially mutual fund shares that trade on a stock exchange and are designed such that the share price tracks a designated commodity index. ETN's are actually debt securities where the issuer promises to make pay-outs based on the value of the underlying commodity index. Both ETFs and ETNs trade on exchanges in the same manner as stocks on individual companies. The management company that initially offers and manages the fund or note collects a fee for their services. To gain commodity exposure, ETF and ETN managers can either buy futures contracts directly, or more likely, utilize OTC commodity return swaps. The swap dealer will subsequently purchase commodity futures contracts to hedge their commodity exposure related to the swap transactions. Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin (2010) show that roughly 85% of indexrelated positions in agricultural futures markets are held by swap dealers. In the non-agricultural markets this percentage is likely to be even higher. However, swap dealers run a much larger "book" of OTC transactions than just index investments. A swap dealer may have a customer who is a traditional short hedger, whose position offsets the long position desired by an ETF. In this case, the swap dealer "nets" the two positions internally and may not have to go to the futures market to place a long hedge if the positions offset one another. If long hedging in futures is required, it may be in a much smaller quantity than the original index swap made with the ETF due to internal netting. Swap dealer netting has been shown to be relatively small in agricultural futures markets, where swap dealers do relatively little non-index business; however, it can be quite large in the energy and metals markets (CFTC 2008) . Figure 1 demonstrates the alternative flow of total commodity index investments into net futures positions.
Measuring the size of commodity index investment is no simple matter. In addition to the netting issue discussed above, there are issues related to counting U.S. versus non-U.S. investments, and how to determine what qualifies as an "index" product. The CFTC has developed three different series related to commodity index investment in U.S. futures markets; this reflects the various assumptions about measuring index investment (see Irwin and Sanders (2010) for a discussion of the three series). Figure 2 presents combined U.S. and non-U.S. asset totals in commodity index products collected by Barclays Capital -one of the longest and oldest series available -from the fourth quarter of 2004 through the third quarter of 2010. This series indicates that assets surged by over $200 billion starting in late 2004, reaching a peak of over $250 billion in mid-2008. Following a sharp decline during the recession, assets resumed their upward climb, reaching a new peak of about $300 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2010. 7 The plot also reveals that nearly all of the recent growth in assets has been in exchange-traded products and commodity notes. Finally, it is important to remember when viewing such data that it measures total assets under management, which is affected by inflows and outflows of investment funds and commodity price changes. and KCBOT wheat, and 30-40% in CBOT wheat. By any reasonable standard, index investment positions, at least in these grain futures markets, are indeed very large.
A relevant question in light of the large positions of commodity index funds is whether the positions should be considered speculation, hedging, or something altogether new. Stoll and Whaley (2010) argue that commodity index investments are not speculative because the investments are long-only, passive, fully-collateralized, and motivated by portfolio diversification benefits. This is an accurate description of the way commodity index investments are developed and marketed to investors. Most public statements by institutional investors emphasize the primary advantage of commodity investments as diversification -providing a return that is uncorrelated with core equity and bond holdings. However, what is not known with any degree of certainty is the actual motivation of institutional or individual investors in commodity index funds. While the funds are strictly long-only, they can still be used by investors as a trading instrument; money can be invested in index funds when expected returns are believed to be high and withdrawn when returns are expected to be low or negative. Intriguing evidence on the motivation of commodity investors is provided by a recent Barclays Capital survey (Norrish 2010) . In response to the question, "Why do you invest in commodities," 43% of respondents said portfolio diversification, 31% said absolute returns, 9% said inflation hedge, and 17% said emerging market growth. The responses indicate that there is a speculative component to at least some commodity index fund positions.
What is a Bubble? Brunnermeier (2008, p.578 ) defines a bubble as, " . . . asset prices that exceed an asset's fundamental value because current owners believe that they can resell the asset at an even higher price in the future." While this definition is slightly different from some of the more classical references (O'Hara 2008), it is largely consistent with popular notions. That is, a bubble is characterized by two elements. First, prices are "inexplicable based on fundamentals" (Garber 2000, p. 4) . Second, the trading motive itself is unrelated to fundamental values, as market participants believe they can always sell to a greater fool. The end result is the classic market action identified (ex post) as, " . . . an upward price movement over an extended range that then implodes," (Kindleberger 1996, p. 13) . The economic damage from an asset pricing bubble may be extensive since the market provides false signals about value. In particular, an inflated price may induce the over-production of an asset and misallocation of productive resources.
To understand the conditions for an asset pricing bubble to occur, it is useful to first review the assumptions that ensure rational asset pricingusually defined as a situation where market price equals the present value of the future income stream associated with an asset (fundamental value). Theoretical modeling (e.g., Tirole 1982) has deduced several key assumptions necessary for rational asset pricing: i) an infinite number of potential traders; ii) traders believe other traders are rational; iii) traders start with the same prior beliefs about the future income stream; iv) no restrictions on short-selling or arbitrage; and v) the economy has an efficient allocation of resources before trading begins. If any of these assumptions are violated, then a pricing bubble can form. For example, bubbles can occur with the large-scale entry of unsophisticated "noise" traders who have mistaken beliefs about their prospects for future income streams. Rational traders would normally arbitrage any mispricing that results, but they may also restrain arbitrage positions due to noise trader risk (De Long et al. 1990 ). Noise trader risk stems from the unpredictability of noise trader positions. However, if noise traders behave in a predictable fashion, there is no noise trader risk, and asset pricing bubbles cannot occur.
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From the perspective of economic theory, commodity futures contracts are not the type of market one would predict as being likely susceptible to bubble-like activity. Specifically, futures contracts are finite-horizon instruments with virtually no constraints on short-sales, which eliminate the potential for a bubble in theoretical models (if the other assumptions listed above hold). In addition, long-lasting bubbles are less likely in markets where deviations from fundamental value can be readily arbitraged away (easily "poached" in the terminology of Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991) ). There are few limitations to arbitrage in commodity futures markets, because the cost of trading is relatively low, trades can be executed literally by the second, and prices are highly transparent. This stands in contrast to markets where arbitrage is more difficult, such as residential housing. The low likelihood of bubbles is also supported by many studies on the efficiency of price discovery in commodity futures markets (see Zulauf and Irwin 1998; Carter 1999; Garcia and Leuthold 2004) . Finally, experimental evidence -which largely supports the existence of bubbles -shows that the introduction of a futures market lessens the incidence of bubbles (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 1984; Noussair and Tucker 2006) .
While it is arguable that bubbles have actually occurred with any frequency in financial history, at least in the sense defined by economists, the term has definitely been more in vogue over the last decade, with proclaimed "bubbles" in information technology stocks and residential housing, as well as suspected bubbles in U.S. Treasury securities and commodity futures prices. Indeed, while economists are typically careful in their use of the term "bubble," the popular press has seemingly adopted the label for any market that makes a large advance quickly and then makes an equally hasty retreat. As Barlevy (2007) points out, the problem with this popular usage is that large price swings sometimes occur naturally and in response to shifts in supply and demand. This highlights the main difficulty of identifying an asset pricing bubble: disentangling movements in an asset's price due to changing supply and demand fundamentals from those due to bubble behavior. This is especially hard because fundamental value depends not only on expectations about futures income streams, but also upon discount (interest) rates.
It Was a Bubble
The Arguments
Masters (2008) has interwoven investment and price data to create the most widely-cited bubble argument, painting the activity of index funds as being akin to the infamous Hunt brothers' cornering of the silver market in the early 1980s. Masters blames the rapid increase in overall commodity prices from 2007-2008 on institutional investors' embrace of commodities as an investable asset class. As discussed in the previous section, it is clear that considerable investment dollars flowed into commodity index funds over this time period. However, the evidence provided by Masters is limited to anecdotes and the temporal correlation between money flows and prices. Masters and White (2008) recommend specific regulatory steps to address the alleged problems created by index fund investment in commodity futures markets, including the re-establishment of speculative position limits for all speculators in all commodity futures markets, as well as the elimination or severe restriction of index speculation.
A similar position was taken by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in its examination of the performance of the CBOT wheat futures contract: "This Report finds that there is significant and persuasive evidence to conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the major causes of "unwarranted changes" -here, increases -in the price of wheat futures contracts relative to the price of wheat in the cash market. The resulting unusual, persistent and large disparities between wheat futures and cash prices impaired the ability of participants in the grain market to use the futures market to price their crops and hedge their price risks over time, and therefore constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Report finds that the activities of commodity index traders, in the aggregate, constituted "excessive speculation" in the wheat market under the Commodity Exchange Act," (USS/PSI 2009, p. 2).
Based on these findings, the Subcommittee recommended the: 1) phase out of existing position limit waivers for index traders in wheat; 2) if necessary, the imposition of additional restrictions on index traders, such as a position limit of 5,000 contracts per trader; 3) investigation of index trading in other agricultural markets; and 4) the strengthening of data collection on index trading in non-agricultural markets.
One of the limitations of the bubble argument made by Masters is that the link between money inflows from index funds and commodity futures prices is not well developed. This allows critics to assert that bubble proponents make the classical statistical mistake of confusing correlation with causation. In other words, simply observing that large investment has flowed into the long side of commodity futures markets at the same time that prices have risen substantially does not necessarily prove anything without a logical and causal link between the two. One attempt to establish this linkage was delivered in testimony by Todd Petzel, Chief Investment Officer for Offit Capital Advisors, at a July 2009 CFTC hearing on position limits in energy futures markets:
"Seasoned observers of commodity markets know that as non-commercial participants enter a market, the opposite side is usually taken by a short-term liquidity provider, but the ultimate counterparty is likely to be a commercial. In the case of commodity index buyers, evidence suggests that the sellers are not typically other investors or leveraged speculators. Instead, they are owners of the physical commodity who are willing to sell into the futures market and either deliver at expiration or roll their hedge forward if the spread allows them to profit from continued storage. This activity is effectively creating "synthetic" long positions in the commodity for the index investor, matched against real inventories held by the shorts. We have seen high spot prices along with large inventories and strong positive carry relationships as a result of the expanded index activity over the last few years," (Petzel 2009, pp. 8-9 ).
In essence, Petzel (2009) argues that unleveraged futures positions of index funds are effectively synthetic long positions in physical commodities, and hence represent new demand. If the magnitude of index fund demand is large enough relative to physically-constrained supplies in the short-run, prices and price volatility can increase sharply. The bottom line is that the size of index fund investment is "too big" for the size of commodity futures markets.
Hamilton (2009b) develops a formal model of price determination in the crude oil market that generates specific theoretical conditions for speculative impact; he begins by noting that the key challenge is reconciling a speculative bubble in crude oil prices with changes in the physical quantities of crude oil. A standard argument is that a price bubble will inevitably lead to a rise in inventories as the quantity supplied at the "bubble price" exceeds the quantity demanded (Krugman 2008 ). Hamilton's theoretical model is based on a profit-maximizing representative refiner of crude oil into gasoline, an exogenous supply of crude oil, and a demand function for gasoline. Solution of the model for the optimal inventory management condition of the refiner leads to important predictions about price behavior and inventories. In particular, if the demand for gasoline is perfectly inelastic and speculators are able to force up the forward (futures) price of crude oil for non-fundamental reasons, this will force the current (spot) price of crude oil to rise in order to maintain equilibrium in the storage market. However, if the elasticity of gasoline demand is less than perfectly inelastic, the standard result follows that inventories must also increase. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) develop a theoretical model that emphasizes the underlying "macro" forces that may be driving a bubble in commodity prices. The model divides the world into two regions; the first has developed financial markets, and the other does not. Since commodity producers are assumed to be located in the region with less developed financial markets, producers are forced to hold financial assets from the developed region as a store of wealth, which leads to a decline in real interest rates in this region. Bubbles form in asset markets, including commodity markets, in response to the decline in real interest rates. Once again, a key prediction of this model is that commodity inventories accumulate during the building phase of the price bubble. An interesting feature of this model is that equilibrium is invariant to the presence of a futures market. The bubble is ultimately fed only by global imbalances in the supply of liquid and safe financial assets.
Empirical Evidence
We review here five studies that provide empirical evidence of a bubble and/or a statistical linkage between index fund activity and commodity futures price movements. These studies are selected because they contain statistical analysis that directly tests whether the recent commodity price spike contained a bubble component and/or whether index fund trading contributed to the price spike. Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2009) . Tests using daily data indicate bubbles in seven of the nine markets, but for a surprisingly small percentage of the days in the sample. For instance, statistically significant bubbles are present in only 21 out of the 753 days for crude oil futures, or less than 3% of the entire 2006-2008 sample period. Not surprisingly, the "bubble days" are concentrated entirely near the peak of prices in the summer of 2008. Gilbert also constructs a quantum index of commodity index fund investment in futures markets using positions of index traders in the 12 agricultural markets reported in the CFTC's weekly CIT report. Granger causality tests are used to establish whether lagged changes in the quantum index help to forecast returns ( price changes) in each of the seven markets included in the analysis. The results indicate a significant relationship between index fund trading activity and returns in three of the seven markets: crude oil, aluminum, and copper. Gilbert estimates the maximum impact of index funds in these markets to be a price increase of 15%.
Gilbert's (2009) results point towards a non-negligible impact of index funds on price in at least some commodity futures markets. There are reasons for caution, however. The first is that rejection of the null hypothesis in a Granger causality test should be viewed as only a preliminary indication of a true casual relationship. Newbold (1982) provides a classic discussion of the problems that can arise in rejecting the null in such tests, and these include: i) economic agents' expectations about the future can make it appear as if there is a relationship between two variables when in fact there is none; ii) the apparent causal relationship between two variables may actually be the result of a third variable omitted from the 10 We make no claim to having uncovered any and all studies that may contain such evidence. This is certainly an active area of current economic research around the world and additional studies will undoubtedly emerge. analysis; and iii) without an explicit theory that establishes a link between two variables, the meaning of a non-zero correlation is unclear.
The second reason is related to the index of commodity index fund activity used by Gilbert (2009) ; his quantum index is a weighted average of index trader positions in agricultural futures markets (as reported in the CFTC's CIT report). The weights are nearest-to-expiration futures prices on the first date of his sample. Gilbert (2009) then applies this index not only to three of the agricultural markets included in the index, but also to the energy and metal markets not included in the index. Application of an index constructed from the 12 CIT agricultural markets to the energy and metals markets is justified only if one believes the pattern of index trader positions in agricultural markets closely mirrors the pattern in energy and metals markets. Gilbert (2009) presents no evidence whether this is a reasonable assumption or not. This point is reinforced by noting that he did not find evidence of a relationship between index fund activity in agricultural markets, upon which the index is based, but did find evidence in energy and metals markets, which are not included in the index.
Gilbert (2010) investigates the factors driving the 2007-2008 increase in food prices; he argues that agricultural price booms are better explained by common demand-side factors than individual market supply-side factors. He goes on to specify a multi-equation model where changes in aggregate food commodity prices are a function of changes in the price of crude oil, commodity index investment, and a U.S. dollar exchange rate index. Changes in the price of oil and commodity index investment are endogenous variables, and the change in the U.S. dollar exchange rate is exogenous. Commodity index investment is measured using the same quantum index as in his 2009 study, and it is specified as a function of changes in the U.S. dollar index, Chinese industrial production, and U.S. and Chinese stock market indices. This specification is based on the argument that index investment is not driven by portfolio diversification, but rather by investors' view that the demand for raw material from China will push up commodity prices. Gilbert (2010) estimates model parameters using monthly data from March 2006 to June 2009, which indicate a large and statistically significant impact of commodity index investment on the food price index. However, Gilbert does not interpret index investment as a fundamental cause of the food price boom, but instead it is viewed as the channel by which the main drivers -rapid Chinese economic growth and dollar depreciationaffected the price of food. This is another form of the argument that underlying "macro" forces created a bubble in commodity prices rather than index funds per se (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008) . Once again, there are good reasons for caution when interpreting these results. For example, the sample period is very short for estimating a structuraltype econometric model (which the author acknowledges). Further, the model implicitly assumes that index investment is entirely speculative, certainly a controversial assumption. Finally, there is little information about the sensitivity of estimation results to alternative specifications of the variables included in the model. It would not be surprising to find that results are quite sensitive to model specification given the short time period used to estimate the model. Einloth (2009) devises a test of bubbles based on the joint behavior of convenience yields and prices in a storable commodity futures market. Here, convenience yield is the flow of benefits that accrue to inventory holders from having stocks of the commodity on hand. For example, the costs of shutting down an oil refinery due to the unavailability of crude oil may be very high; thus, the operator may hold some stocks as insurance against this possibility. The basic theory of storage predicts that low inventories lead to a rising commodity price and an increasing marginal convenience yield (Working 1948; 1949) . Thus, the combination of a rising futures price and a falling marginal convenience yield is a violation of this theory. Einloth uses this condition as a test for speculative impact in the crude oil futures market, and finds that marginal convenience yield (derived from differences between futures prices) rose for most of the increase in crude oil futures prices up to $100/barrel, but fell as crude oil increased from about $100 to $140/barrel. While this indicates that speculation may have played a role near the peak in crude oil prices, the technique cannot attribute this to a particular group of market participants, such as index funds.
There is no doubt that Einloth is correct in arguing that the basic theory of storable commodity markets rules out the combination of falling marginal convenience yield and rising futures prices. However, more sophisticated versions of the theory show that this combination can occur, not due to speculative impacts, but because market participants are reacting rationally to a particular set of incentives. For example, Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) develop an equilibrium model of price behavior for a storable commodity where the spot commodity has an embedded timing option that is a function of endogenous inventory and exogenous supply and demand shocks. In this model, falling marginal convenience yield can be observed at the same time that futures prices are rising if the value of the timing option is large enough. This could occur if the probability of a sequence of large positive demand shocks or negative supply shocks increases substantially. The implication is that Einloth's test may not identify bubbles, but instead unusual periods where the timing option derived from holding inventories increases at the same time that price also rises. Tang and Xiong (2010) do not test for bubbles in commodity futures prices. Instead, they argue that commodity markets were not fully integrated with financial markets prior to the development of commodity index investments and, "The increasing presence of index investors in commodities markets precipitated a fundamental process of financialization amongst the commodities markets, through which commodity prices now become more correlated with the prices of financial assets and each other," ( p. 2). Statistical tests confirm that the correlation of commodity futures returns with stock, bond, U.S. dollar, and crude oil returns Tang and Xiong recognize that increasing correlations could be due to a variety of factors, such as the financial shocks associated with the recent recession and the increasing impact of crude oil prices on many commodities (e.g., de Gorter and Just 2010), and address this "identification" issue with a difference-in-difference approach. Specifically, they test whether the increase in correlation of commodity futures returns with stock, bond, U.S. dollar, and crude oil returns post-2004 is greater for commodities included in major indices (such as the-S&P-GSCI) compared to commodities not included in the indices. A statistically significant increase for in-versus off-index commodity markets is estimated for five non-energy sectors, leading the authors to conclude that index investment has increasingly impacted commodity futures prices (although in a non-bubble manner).
Tang and Xiong's study appears to provide concrete evidence of a linkage between commodity index investment and futures price movements. The results are also consistent with other types of evidence about the price impact of investment flows in financial markets (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler 2005) . Nonetheless, there are several reasons for viewing Tang and Xiong's findings with caution. The first reason is that the average magnitude of correlation increases is small after 2004 for inversus off-index commodities. The simplest way to emphasize this point is to compare the estimated correlations across in-and off-index commodities for the final year of the sample, 2009. Considering the results for regressions in which correlations (exposures) are estimated jointly for all four financial variables (regression (6) in their table 5), one discovers that differences in correlations for in-versus off-index commodities in 2009 average only 0.05, -0.03, -0.06, and 0.14 for equity index, bond index, dollar index, and crude oil returns, respectively, across the five commodity sectors. While these differences generally are statistically significant, the economic significance of such small differences is debatable.
The second reason for viewing Tang and Xiong's findings with caution is that the difference-in-difference approach used by the authors may not adequately control for fundamental factors that are common to all commodities in a given sector. Ai, Chatrath, and Song (2006) show how a failure to properly condition on market fundamentals can lead to incorrect inferences in co-movement tests. A particular concern with Tang and Xiong's study is the representativeness of the non-index "control" markets in some sectors. Two of the four non-index markets in the grain sector are rough rice and oats futures, both of which are thinly-traded and illiquid markets. The same can be said of the only two non-index markets in the soft commodity sector, lumber and orange juice. The most egregious example is in the livestock sector, where the sole non-index market is pork bellies. This is, for all intents and purposes, a dead market with close to zero open interest. Comparison to illiquid and unrepresentative markets could induce a bias in the difference-in-difference regression estimates.
The third reason for viewing Tang and Xiong's findings cautiously is that several other studies indicate that commodity futures markets have been integrated with financial markets for decades, contradicting Tang and Xiong's basic thesis. For example, Bjornson and Carter (1997) examine seven commodity futures markets from 1969-1994, and find that expected returns are lower during times of high interest rates, expected inflation, and economic growth, leading the authors to conclude that commodities provide a natural hedge against business cycles. In a recent paper, Hong and Yogo (2010) document that information about future inflation has been priced into commodity futures markets since at least the mid-1960s (albeit with a delay).
Phillips and Yu (2010) introduce a new recursive test for bubble characteristics in financial time series. Essentially, the sequential procedure uses standard tests (Dickey-Fuller t tests) for unit root behavior in prices against "mildly explosive alternatives" that would characterize a bubble. The recursive procedure is powerful in the sense that it allows for the "time stamping" of the start and end date for a bubble, and it can be applied in real time to identify when a bubble is forming. Following Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) , the authors hypothesize that global liquidity imbalances drove a series of financial bubbles that migrated from technology stocks to housing, on to subprime mortgages, and then into commodity markets and eventually the bond market (after the subprime crises broke). Test results are largely consistent with this sequence, identifying a bubble in subprime mortgage derivatives from August 2005 through July 2007, which then migrated to selected commodity markets. Specifically, the authors find evidence of bubble price characteristics from March 2008 to August 2008 in crude oil and heating oil. Notably, however, there is no evidence of a bubble in prices for coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar or feeder cattle.
The findings of Phillips and Yu (2010) are certainly interesting and represent some of the more convincing evidence of bubble-like activity in energy prices. However, the lack of evidence for the other commodities tested is inconsistent with the notion that a wave of index fund buying pushed up all commodity prices. Moreover, the authors' selection of markets (e.g., feeder cattle) and data (e.g., deflated spot prices) may not translate to equivalent findings in the grain and oilseed futures markets, where concerns about a bubble are typically focused.
To summarize, the studies reviewed in this section are interesting, rigorous, and make a valuable contribution to the debate about the market impact of commodity index funds. Results in these studies also negate the argument that no evidence exists of a bubble in commodity futures prices or a relationship between commodity index investment and movements in commodity futures prices. However, the data and methods used in these studies are subject to a number of important criticisms that limit the degree of confidence one can place in the results.
It Was Not a Bubble
The Arguments A number of economists have expressed skepticism about the bubble argument (e.g., Krugman 2008; Pirrong 2008; Sanders and Irwin 2008; Smith 2009 ). These economists cite several contrary facts and argue that commodity markets were driven by fundamental factors that pushed prices higher. Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin (2009) and Pirrong (2010) present useful summaries of the counter-arguments made by economists. We categorize these into three logical inconsistencies in the arguments made by bubble proponents and four instances where the bubble story is not consistent with observed facts.
The first possible logical inconsistency within the bubble argument is equating demand with money inflows to commodity futures markets. With equally informed market participants, there is no limit to the number of futures contracts that can be created at a given price level. Index fund buying in this situation is no more "new demand" than the corresponding selling is "new supply." Futures contracts are "pure bets" in this context (Black 1976) , with a long for every short such that commodity futures markets are zero-sum games. This implies that money flows in and of themselves do not necessarily impact prices. Rather, prices will only change if new information emerges that causes market participants to revise their estimates of physical supply and/or demand.
What happens when market participants are not equally informed? When this is the case, it is rational for participants to condition demands on both their own information and information about other participants' demands that can be inferred ("inverted") from the futures price (Grossman 1986 ). The trades of uninformed participants can impact prices in this more realistic model if informed traders mistakenly believe that trades made by uninformed participants ("noise") reflect valuable information about supply and demand fundamentals. Hence, it is possible that other traders in commodity futures markets interpreted the large order flow of index funds on the long side of the market as a reflection of valuable private information about commodity price prospects, which would have had the effect of driving prices higher as these traders revised their own demands upward. Of course, this would have required a large number of sophisticated and experienced traders in commodity futures markets to reach the conclusion that index fund investors possessed valuable information that they themselves did not possess.
The second possible logical inconsistency of the bubble story is in the argument that index fund investors artificially raised both futures and cash commodity prices when they only participated in futures markets. These contracts are financial transactions that only rarely involve the actual delivery of physical commodities. In order to impact the equilibrium price of commodities in the cash market, index investors would have to take delivery and/or buy quantities in the cash market and hold these inventories off the market. Index investors are purely involved in a financial transaction using futures markets; they do not engage in the purchase or hoarding of the cash commodity and any causal linkages between their futures market activity and cash prices is unclear at best.
A third possible logical inconsistency of the bubble argument is the blanket categorization of speculators, particularly index fund speculators, as wrongdoers, and hedgers as victims of their actions. In reality, the "bad guy" is not so easily identified since hedgers sometimes speculate and some speculators also hedge. For example, large commercial firms may have valuable information gleaned from their far-flung cash market operations and then trade based on that information. 11 The following passage from a recent article on Cargill, Inc. nicely illustrates the point: "Wearing multiple hats gives Cargill an unusually detailed view of the industries it bets on, as well as the ability to trade on its knowledge in ways few others can match. Cargill freely acknowledges it strives to profit from that information. "When we do a good job of assimilating all those seemingly unrelated facts," says Greg Page, Cargill's chief executive, in a rare interview, "it provides us an opportunity to 11 Hieronymus (1977) argued that large commercial firms dominated commodity futures markets, and speculators tended to be at a disadvantage. Based on his theoretical analysis, Grossman (1986, p. S140) asserted, " . . . it should come as no surprise if a study of trading profit finds that traders representing large firms involved in the spot commodity (i.e., commercial traders) make large trading profits on futures markets." In the classic empirical study on this subject, Hartzmark (1987) showed that large commercial firms in six of seven futures markets make substantial profits on their futures trades. make money . . . without necessarily having to make directional trades, i.e., outguess the weather, outguess individual governments," (Davis 2009 ).
The implication is that the interplay between varied market participants is more complex than a standard textbook description of pure risk-avoiding hedgers and pure risk-seeking speculators. The reality is that market dynamics are ever -changing, and it can be difficult to understand the motivations and market implications of trading, especially in real-time.
In addition to the logical inconsistencies, there are several ways the bubble story is not consistent with the observed facts. First, theoretical models (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008; Hamilton 2009b) show that if a bubble raises the market price of a storable commodity above the true equilibrium price, then stocks of that commodity should increase (much like a government-imposed price floor can create a surplus). The fact that stocks were declining, not building, in most commodity markets from 2006-2008 is therefore an important contradiction of the price bubble argument in these markets (see Korniotis (2009) and Pirrong (2010) for detailed statistics and analysis). There are two possible counterpoints to this observation. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) argue that inventory for an exhaustible resource like crude oil includes un-extracted oil in the ground and it is possible that the below-ground rise in inventory more than offset the above-ground (measured) decline in inventory. Hamilton (2009b) notes that the buildup of (above-ground) inventories due to a price bubble could be so small that it is not easily detected if the elasticity of demand for the storable commodity is very small or zero.
The second factual inconsistency of the bubble story is that if index fund buying drove commodity prices higher, then markets without index fund investment should not have seen a price advance. Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin (2009) show that markets without index fund participation (fluid milk and rice futures) and commodities without futures markets (apples and edible beans) also showed price increases during the 2006-2008 period. Stoll and Whaley (2010) report that returns for CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, and Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX) wheat are all highly positively correlated from 2006-2009, yet only CBOT and KCBOT wheat are used heavily by index investors. Stoll and Whaley also observe that Commodity Exchange (COMEX) gold, COMEX silver, New York Mercantile (NYMEX) palladium, and NYMEX platinum futures prices are highly correlated over the same time period, but only gold and silver are included in popular commodity indices. Pirrong (2010) reports that the price of shipping services increased dramatically between June 2007 and July 2008 in concert with other commodity prices, which, he argues, contradicts the bubble story since shipping services are nonstorable and therefore should not be susceptible to asset bubble influences. There are two notable counterpoints to these observations. Petzel (2009) argues that many of the comparisons are problematic because a bubble in one market could be transferred to other markets through well-known market linkages (i.e., cross-price elasticities). 12 Tang and Xiong (2010) point out that the relative magnitude of price increases for index and nonindex (storable) commodities is relevant whether or not non-index commodities increased in price.
The third factual inconsistency with the bubble story is that speculation was not excessive when correctly compared to hedging demands. The statistics on long-only index fund trading reported in the media and discussed at hearings tend to view speculation in a vacuum focusing on absolute position size and activity. Working (1960) argued that speculation must be gauged relative to hedging needs. In particular, speculation can only be considered "excessive" relative to the level of hedging activity in the market. Utilizing Working's speculative T-index, Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin (2010) demonstrate that the level of speculation in nine agricultural futures markets from 2006-2008 (adjusting for index fund positions) was not excessive. Indeed, the levels of speculation in all markets examined were within the realm of historical norms. Across most markets, the rise in index buying was more than offset by commercial (hedger) selling. Buyuksahin and Harris (2009) The fourth observable fact that contradicts the bubble story relates to the impact of index funds across markets; a priori, there is no reason to expect index funds to have a differential impact across markets given similar position sizes. In other words, one would expect markets with the highest concentration of index fund positions to show the largest price increases. But Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin (2009) find just the opposite when comparing grain and livestock futures markets. The highest concentration of index fund positions was often in livestock markets, which had the smallest price increases through the spring of 2008. This is difficult to reconcile with the assertion that index buying was responsible for a price bubble.
Empirical Evidence
We review here nine studies that do not provide empirical evidence of a bubble and/or a statistical linkage between index fund activity and commodity futures price movements. 13 As in the previous section, studies are selected because they contain statistical analysis that directly tests whether the recent commodity price spike contained a bubble component and/or index fund trading contributed to the price spike. Most of the studies focus on testing for a relationship between index fund trading and commodity futures price movements since this is the most direct type of evidence.
14 Buyuksahin and Harris (2009) use daily data from the CFTC's internal large trader database from July 2000-March 2009 to conduct a variety of tests on the relation between crude oil futures prices and positions of various types of traders. Granger causality tests provide no statistical evidence that position changes (number of contracts) by any trader group 13 As before, we make no claim to presenting an exhaustive review of all such studies. 14 Though not reviewed here, Robles, Torero, and von Braun (2009) utilize weekly CIT data to conduct Granger causality tests between index positions and futures returns. Despite the overwhelmingly negative results of their statistical analysis, the authors nonetheless assert that there is sufficient evidence of the damaging role of speculation to warrant the creation of a new international organization to counteract this market failure. See Wright (2009) . A unique feature of the study is that price impacts for the five largest trader groups are estimated jointly in a vector autoregression (VAR) system, which allows tests not only of the direct effect of each group on returns or volatility, but also the interaction of positions among the groups. Three groups of speculators are considered: swap dealers, hedge funds, and floor broker/traders. Like Buyuksahin and Harris (2009) , this study assumes that swap dealer positions represent commodity index fund investments. Granger causality tests based on the estimated VAR models yield two main conclusions. First, returns are not forecast by positions of any trader group in the five markets, including swap dealers, with the exception of mini-DOW futures, where there is evidence of a dampening impact of hedge funds. Second, volatility is forecast by swap dealer positions in crude oil and natural gas and by other speculators in all markets except corn. Since the impact is negative, Brunetti and Buyuksahin argue that speculators reduce risk in the futures market and therefore lower the cost of hedging. Once again, the use of swap dealer positions to represent index fund investment is a potential limitation of this study. Stoll and Whaley (2010) use data from the CFTC's weekly CIT report to conduct a variety of tests on the null hypothesis that index fund trading does not cause commodity futures price changes. The authors examine all 12 agricultural markets included in the CIT report from January 2006-July 2009: corn, soybeans, soybean oil, CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, cocoa, cotton, coffee, and sugar. Granger causality tests between weekly futures returns and weekly index fund investment flows reject the null of no causality in only 1 of the 12 markets. The authors also examine the contemporaneous relationship between returns and changes in index fund investment flows after controlling for changes in other speculator investment flows. A significant contemporaneous relationship is found for only 2 of the 12 markets. Two additional "roll" tests are conducted to determine whether the shifting of index fund positions between contracts impacts the relative price movements of the nearest-and next-nearest futures contracts. This analysis is conducted for six commodities tracked in the CIT report, as well as crude oil. These tests find evidence of a significant relative price impact only in crude oil. Overall, Stoll and Whaley conclude that commodity index investing has little impact on futures prices.
Stoll and Whaley's analysis generates virtually no evidence that index trading had an impact on agricultural futures price movements. However, it is not known whether their results generalize to a broader set of commodity futures markets, especially energy futures markets that have been at the center of the current controversy. Another issue is that the power of their statistical tests to reject the null hypothesis of no causality may be decreased by the use of (U.S.) dollar flows to measure index fund participation. Dollar flow measures are computed by multiplying each week's net position (in contracts) by the price of the futures contract nearestto-expiration to obtain a total notional value, and then differencing the total from week-to-week. Because U.S. dollar flows impound into activity measures both the variability of prices and positions, it is a less precise measure of actual index fund buying and selling. Finally, there is the question of the degree to which the CIT data represents actual index investment in agricultural markets. Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2010) show that the bulk of CIT positions are in fact swap dealers hedging OTC exposure. However, swap dealers operating in agricultural markets conduct a limited amount of non-index long or short swap transactions (CFTC 2008) , so there is less measurement error in using the net position of swap dealers in these markets to represent index fund investment. Sanders and Irwin (2010b) investigate the price impact of index fund trading in four grain futures markets. Weekly CIT data for CBOT corn, soybeans, wheat, and KCBOT wheat futures contracts from January 2004 to August 2009 are used in the analysis. 15 The data from [2004] [2005] are not publicly available, and are used for the first time in this study. Extending the sample period with this data is advantageous for two reasons. First, previous research suggests that the buildup in index positions was most rapid from -2005 (Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin 2010 ; this period may thus be the most likely to show the impact of index traders, if any. Second, the additional two years of data increases the sample size of weekly observations considerably compared to the publicly available CIT data, which should improve the power of time-series statistical tests.
The data confirm that there was a fairly dramatic and large build-up in index fund positions in the four grain markets examined by Sanders and Irwin (2010b) . For instance, the number of wheat contracts held by index funds at the CBOT increased nearly fourfold from 2004 to 2006. However, the buildup in index contracts and the peak level of index holdings predates the 2007-2008 increase in grain futures prices for which they are blamed. This observation casts doubt on the hypothesis that index speculation drove the 2007-2008 increase in grain futures prices. In 15 out of 16 tests, both Granger causality and long-horizon regressions fail to reject the null hypothesis that commodity index positions (change in net long CIT contracts or net long CIT contracts/total long market open interest) have no impact on futures prices. Overall, the authors conclude that data trends and statistical test results are not consistent with the widely-touted bubble theory. A limitation of this study is that tests are restricted to four grain futures markets. Sanders and Irwin (2010c) investigate the price impact of index fund trading in 12 agricultural markets and 2 energy futures markets (crude oil and natural gas). Data compiled by the CFTC in the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) report on positions held by swap dealers from June 2006 to December 2009 is assumed to reflect index-type investments. Bivariate Granger causality tests are used to investigate lead-lag dynamics between index fund positions and futures returns or price volatility in each commodity futures market. In addition, a new systems approach to testing lead-lag dynamics is introduced and applied. The systems approach improves the power of statistical tests by taking into account the contemporaneous correlation of model residuals across markets and allows a test of the overall impact of index funds across markets.
The system of Granger-style causality tests fails to reject the null hypothesis that trader positions do not lead returns in the 14 markets analyzed by Sanders and Irwin (2010c) . Hence, there is no evidence of a linkage between index trader positions (as represented by swap dealers) in commodity futures markets and price levels. There is a tendency to reject the null hypothesis that index trader positions do not lead to market volatility. Similar to the results in Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009) , the direction of the impact is consistently negative. While index positions lead to lower volatility in a statistical sense, Sanders and Irwin (2010c) note that it is possible that trader positions coincide with some other fundamental variable that is actually causing the lower market volatility (see the discussion of Newbold (1982) above). Sanders and Irwin (2010c) are also aware that swap dealer positions may be an imperfect proxy for overall index investments due to internal netting of OTC positions by swap dealers, particularly in the energy futures markets. However, they argue that the net position may still be relevant with respect to price impacts since this is the position actually taken to the commodity futures market. Whether netted or non-netted positions are more relevant is an empirical question. Irwin and Sanders (2010) conduct a test of the "Masters Hypothesis" in commodity futures markets using the newest of the CFTC's data series on index fund investment -the quarterly Index Investment Data (IID) report. The IID data is not only a better measure of index investment because positions are measured before internal netting by swap dealers, it also covers the complete spectrum of agricultural, energy, metal and soft commodity futures markets. A cross-sectional regression test is applied to the IID data over the first quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 2010, which captures the rapid increase, peak, and subsequent decline in commodity prices. A cross-sectional approach is likely to improve statistical power compared to time-series Granger-type tests (Sanders and Irwin 2010a ) and a quarterly horizon should better capture a slowly accumulating price pressure effect if it is present in the data. Both lagged and contemporaneous effects are also considered.
Irwin and Sanders' regression estimates provide very little evidence that index positions influence the cross-section of 19 commodity futures market returns or volatility. Only 3 of the 18 average estimated slope coefficients are statistically significant, and 2 of the 3 significant cases have negative signs that contradict the claim that index investment increases returns or volatility. The results are robust regarding whether lagged or contemporaneous effects are considered. The cross-section tests are supplemented with time-series tests using daily positions held by the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Funds, two of the largest exchange-traded index funds (ETFs), in the crude oil and natural gas futures markets, respectively. Granger-causality tests show no causal links between daily returns or volatility in crude oil and natural gas futures markets and the positions of the two large ETFs. Long-horizon regression tests likewise fail to reject the null hypothesis of no market impact for the ETFs. Overall, the empirical results of the study fail to support the hypothesis that index funds were a major driver of the recent spike in commodity prices. Irwin et al. (2011) examine whether index funds were responsible for recent episodes of non-convergence between CBOT corn, soybean, and wheat futures prices and cash prices during the delivery period of the contracts. Some argue that index funds were a major driver of the episodes of non-convergence because index fund investment put upward pressure on the spreads between futures prices for the same commodity due to the "rolling" of positions or the initiation of positions in a "crowded market space" (e.g., USS/PSS 2009; Petzel 2009). If spreads approach full storage and interest opportunity costs, an incentive is created for those taking delivery that effectively de-couples cash and futures prices. The authors do not find evidence of a statistically significant increase in spreads during the roll window of index funds. Whether lagged or contemporaneous effects are considered, Granger causality tests fail to find a statistically significant link between weekly positions of index funds and movements in spreads. Irwin et al. conclude that other factors must be responsible for the non-convergence between cash and futures prices. Buyuksahin and Robe (2010) investigate the source of the recent increase in correlation between stock and commodity returns. The authors first document that the correlation between commodity (S&P-GSCI) and stock index returns (S&P 500 Index TM ) from January 1991 to August 2008 generally fluctuated between -0.40 and 0.40. Almost immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the correlation spiked as high as 0.70 and remained at historically high levels until March 2010. Buyuksahin and Robe utilize disaggregated data from the CFTC's large trader reporting system to test whether the market activity of different groups of traders in commodity futures markets is helpful in explaining the increasing correlation. After accounting for business cycle and other economic factors, only hedge fund activity is a significant factor. In contrast to Tang and Xiong (2010) , no evidence is found that index fund activity (as measured by swap dealer positions) is associated with the increasing correlation between commodity and stock returns. 16 The difference in results is likely due to the detailed information on trading activities of all major participants in commodity futures markets used by Buyuksahin and Robe. Kilian and Murphy (2010) estimate the price elasticity of crude oil (and gasoline) demand because theory indicates a zero or near zero price elasticity of demand is required for speculation to impact spot prices in a storable commodity market (see Hamilton 2009b) . The authors develop a structural VAR (vector autoregression) model of the global market for crude oil that explicitly allows for shocks to the speculative demand for crude oil, as well as shocks to the flow demand and flow supply. Their median estimate of the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil is -0.41, which is about seven times higher than typical conjectures in the recent literature. In a related fashion, the median estimate of the short-run price elasticity of demand for gasoline is -0.20, several times higher than previous estimates. Since the short-run elasticity estimates are substantially larger than zero (in absolute terms), Kilian and Murphy conclude that speculation did not play a major role in the run-up in crude oil prices. The model estimates imply that the surge in crude oil prices from 2003-2008 was caused by fluctuations in the flow demand for oil driven by the global business cycle. As with all structural modeling exercises, Kilian and Murphy's structural VAR model depends on a fairly lengthy list of identifying restrictions. The impact of these restrictions on elasticity estimates will undoubtedly be the subject of further research.
Overall, the results of the studies reviewed in this section provide no systematic evidence of a relationship (statistically or economically) between positions of index funds and the level of commodity futures prices or spreads between commodity futures prices. This finding is consistent across a variety of commodity futures markets, measures of index fund activity, statistical tests, sample periods, and time horizons. Of particular note is the robustness of the results across combined on-and off-exchange index fund positions, netted or non-netted swap dealer positions, and individual ETF positions. It should also be noted that the lack of a relationship is consistent with the majority of academic evidence pertaining to speculation and price behavior (e.g., Petzel 1981; Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo 2004; Bryant, Bessler, and Haigh 2006; Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin 2009) . Finally, there is mild evidence of a negative relationship between index fund positions and the volatility of commodity futures prices, consistent with the traditional view that speculators reduce risk in the futures market and therefore lower the cost of hedging.
Summary and Conclusions
Investment in long-only commodity index funds soared over the last decade. This surge and its attendant impacts have been labeled the "financialization" of commodity futures markets. In view of the scale of this investment -at least $100 billion -it is not surprising that a worldwide debate has ensued about the role of index funds in commodity futures markets. Those who believe index funds were responsible for a bubble in commodity futures prices (e.g., Masters 2008 ) make what seems to be an obvious argument -that the sheer size of index investment overwhelmed the normal functioning of these markets. Those who do not believe index funds were behind the run-up in commodity futures prices in recent years point out logical inconsistencies in the bubble argument, as well as several contradictory facts (e.g., Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 2009; Pirrong 2010).
Not surprisingly, a flurry of studies has been completed recently in an attempt to sort out which side of the debate is correct. One group of studies finds evidence that commodity index investment directly or indirectly had an impact on commodity futures prices (Gilbert 2009 (Gilbert , 2010 Einloth 2009; Tang and Xiong 2010) . Results in these studies negate the argument that no evidence exists of a relationship between commodity index investment and movements in commodity futures prices. However, the data and methods used in these studies are subject to a number of important criticisms that limit the degree of confidence one can place in their results. Another group of studies fails to find systematic evidence of a relationship (statistically or economically) between positions of index funds and the level of commodity futures prices (Buyuksahin and Harris 2009; Brunetti and Buyuksahin 2009; Stoll and Whaley 2010; Sanders and Irwin 2010a , 2010b , 2010c Irwin and Sanders 2010; Buyuksahin and Robe 2010) . The results are robust across combined on-and off-exchange index fund positions, netted or non-netted swap dealer positions, and individual exchange-traded fund (ETF) positions, as well as a variety of statistical tests, sample periods, and time horizons.
Even if one ignores the data and methodological concerns in the first group of empirical studies, the weight of the evidence is not consistent with the argument that index funds created a bubble in commodity futures prices. Whether the wave of index fund investment simply overwhelmed normal supply and demand functions (Masters 2008) , channeled investors' views about commodity price directions (Gilbert 2010) , or integrated financial and commodity markets (Tang and Xiong 2010) , the linkage between the level of commodity futures prices and market positions of index funds should be clearly detectable in the data. Very limited traces of this linkage are visible, however. To date, no "smoking gun" has been found. Moreover, results of studies that test for a bubble component in commodity futures prices -regardless of the cause -are decidedly mixed (Gilbert 2009; Phillips and Yu 2010; Kilian and Murphy 2010) . Therefore, it is unclear if there was a bubble in commodity futures price from 2007-2008, and even less clear whether one was caused by index funds.
From this perspective, the current controversy surrounding index funds can be viewed as simply the latest in a long history of attacks upon speculation in commodity futures markets (Jacks 2007) . For example, Labys and Thomas (1975, p. 287 ) investigated the 1973-75 commodity boom and described the situation in terms remarkably similar to the present controversy, "This paper analyses the instability of primary commodity prices during the recent period of economic upheaval, and determines the extent to which this instability was amplified by the substantial increase in futures speculation which also occurred. Of particular interest is the degree to which this speculation rose and fell with the switch of speculative funds away from traditional asset placements and towards commodity futures contracts." While index funds have become sizable participants in commodity futures markets, there is once again precious little evidence that these "new speculators" drove price movements.
Important implications for public policy follow from the conclusion that index funds were not a primary driver of the 2007-08 commodity price boom. New limits on speculation are not grounded in well-established empirical findings and could impede the price discovery and risk-shifting functions of these markets. In particular, limiting the participation of index fund investors would diminish an important source of risk-bearing capacity at a time when such capacity is in high demand. Commodity futures markets would become less efficient mechanisms for transferring risk from parties who don't want to bear it to those that do, creating added costs that ultimately get passed back to producers in the form of lower prices and back to consumers as higher prices. Moreover, new speculative position limits in futures may simply push index fund investors into physical commodity markets (Kaminska 2010) , where index investments would not be subject to speculative futures position limits. Index fund positions in physical (cash) markets would provide a much more direct means by which financial investors could impact price discovery and stockholding in commodity markets; seemingly not the desired outcome of the regulatory drive to limit futures speculation.
There are several issues related to the 2007-2008 spike in commodity prices that merit further investigation. First, a number of potential explanations for the spike have been offered beyond speculation -including demand growth from China and other developing economies, biofuel policies, monetary policy, trade restrictions, and supply shortfalls -but there is no consensus about their relative impacts. While some researchers have begun to tackle this question (e.g., Frankel and Rose 2009; Kilian and Murphy 2010; Martin and Anderson 2010; Heady and Fan 2010) , much more effort is needed before a clear consensus can be reached. Second, even if index funds did not affect the level of commodity futures prices, this does not preclude other impacts. A logical place to investigate is the market for storage. Classical economic writers such as Cootner (1961) and Weymar (1968) argued that the introduction of futures trading in a commodity market flattens the supply of storage curve because the activity of futures speculators increases risk-carrying capacity. It is not unreasonable to posit that the large-scale addition of index investors increased stockholding capacity in a similar fashion, a point made by Verleger (2009) with respect to crude oil. The available evidence on index funds' impact on the market for storage has so far been limited to time-series analysis of the behavior of futures spreads (Stoll and Whaley 2010; Irwin et al. 2011) . Research is needed that investigates possible structural impacts on the supply and demand for storage in commodity markets. Third, the "financialization" of commodity futures markets generally has been defined in terms of the rise of commodity index funds. The emerging evidence (Etula 2009; Buyuksahin and Robe 2010) indicates that other types of traders, such as broker-dealers and hedge funds, play key roles in transmitting shocks to commodity futures markets from other sectors. This is a promising avenue for increasing our understanding of the pricing dynamics in commodity futures markets. 
